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TRANSFORMING THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD THE STAGE IS SET.
Today's Army National Guard Field Artillery Brigades (ARNG FA BDEs) are facing monumental changes in the near term based on the effects of three diverse strategic initiatives including transformation, force structure realignment and Homeland Security (HS) mission requirements. The effects of transformation create a new FA BDE structure (Fires BDE), force structure realignment processes dramatically reduce the number of FA BDEs found in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and HS mission requirements affect the training plans and operational focus of the Fires BDE.
The strategic guidance concerning implementation of these initiatives originates from various levels and offices, but includes the President, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), the Chief of National Guard Bureau (CNGB) and the Governors of 54 separate States and Territories. Strategic guidance establishes the operational framework within which the transformed FA BDEs must function and defines the standards for success within each initiative. This paper will examine the effects of transformation and potential HS mission requirements (using force structure realignment impacts to shape the discussion) on the NG Fires BDE and identify issues requiring action to facilitate the success of the NG Fires BDE.
THE GUIDANCE TO TRANSFORM
The Commander in Chief, President George W. Bush, initiated today's military transformation, the largest change to the US Army since the end of World War II, 1 when he described the threat to America today as, "…terrorism [the] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents," 2 and noted that this threat so differs from our historic struggle between liberty and totalitarianism 3 that a new type of US military was required to adequately respond. The President noted that today's military, "A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur." 4 The SECDEF has further described the President's transformed military as; "A … force … defined less by size and more by mobility … easier to deploy and sustain, [relying] on … precision weaponry and information technologies," 5 and as "fundamentally joint, [and] network-centric…." 6 Other critical senior level guidance includes that transformation must start now 7 and occur concurrently with ongoing operations, and that "transformation is not an end point," 8 but a way of thought and mindset. and security operations / terrorism response tasks. 21 The congressionally mandated dual mission requirement of the NG force is currently based on the precept that units bring their wartime assets and skills to the HS fight, versus creating a separate structure to conduct HS requirements. The transformed structure of the NG Fires BDE is solely a product of warfighting requirements and those are the assets and skills that the Fires BDE will provide HS.
While specific HS tasks remain to be identified, the individual and collective training conducted by units to prepare for federal wartime deployment will prepare that unit for a large percentage of anticipated HS requirements. Because wartime assets and skill sets are the predominant contribution of ARNG units to HS, the CNGB, in concert with 54 states and territories, is working to rebalance NG forces across the nation in an effort to support each
Governor with a force mix capable of providing multi-spectrum support. 22 The rebalancing of the force is outside the scope of this paper, but will likely affect individual NG Fires BDEs in terms of physical location. BDEs produces numerous second and third order effects, requiring several significant paradigm shifts as described in the following analysis.
A TRANSFORMED FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE
AN ANALYSIS USING THE DOTMLPF 28 MODEL
DOCTRINE
The key conceptual imperative driving doctrinal change is that future US forces will likely be challenged by adversaries who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric terrorist approaches, massed land warfare and everything in between, to include weapons of mass destruction. 29 The doctrinal result is that the US Army must be capability based, 30 and focus on how an adversary might fight rather than on who the adversary is. 31 Today's combat leaders must be prepared to deal with a wider range of challenges than ever before 32 and services must plan for asymmetric warfare as well as major combat operations. 33 Key to success in this arena are doctrinal traits described as versatile, expeditionary, joint, interdependent, precision and network centric, all of which have been incorporated into the construct of transformed FA formations, and are described in the following paragraphs. The joint and interdependent doctrinal trait means the tendency of the Army to rely on organic assets to accomplish the mission must change. We will always fight jointly 36 As the Fires BDEs prepare to train in a joint, interagency environment, the additional factors of meeting readiness requirements for a dual (state and nation) mission set and fulfilling the evolving requirements of an "operational" versus "strategic" reserve 52 require consideration.
Current indications are that the NG will continue to deploy at current levels, with a goal of deploying separate units no more than once every five or six years. 53 The deployment model established by NGB (see figure 3 ) provides an excellent baseline to plan and synchronize training while incorporating the competing demands on the National Guard, helps stabilize the force and provides predictability to units and soldiers. This new rotational construct works extremely well for a six ARNG Fires BDE force, permitting each Fires BDE to occupy a different position (year) on the circle with annual sequential rotation. By design and critical to the success of the model, one Fires BDE is trained, ready and available to deploy each cycle. The deployment of the Fires BDE could be in support of an AC or NG UEx and whether the Fires BDE actually deploys is irrelevant, because the focused training that the Fires BDE conducted in preparation for deployment creates a better unit.
Pending the realities of a global war, the proposed model provides stability to the force and forms the foundation for a coordinated training plan, allowing a Fires BDE to focus on its various (federal/state) missions throughout the cycle. While new (post 9/11) formal specific HS mission tasks at the state level are not well defined, 54 the goal of the Fires BDE should be to maintain a high HS readiness posture in the currently assumed mission set 55 while maintaining a solid baseline in their "Go to War" tasks while in the HS portion of the circle. As the Fires BDE rotates to the set position and prepares to deploy, the training requirement shifts to achieving and maintaining a high state of readiness for "Go to War" tasks while the HS tasks receive lesser attention. Throughout the cycle, the Fires BDE actually trains in both required mission sets, knowing that in some cases, the tasks are mutually supporting. (For example, the task of establishing and defending a unit perimeter is much like establishing a perimeter around and defending a potential piece of critical national infrastructure, a likely HS task.) In concert with the guidance issued by the CSA, we must develop an expeditionary mindset in the minds of our NG soldiers. For the Guardsman, such a mindset involves two elements; initially, the Guardsman must accept that he/she is part of the "operational reserve"
and understand deployment requirements 61 ; secondly, the change in tactical doctrine as described by the CSA, requires an expeditionary approach to warfare, an approach, again described by the CSA, as; "the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace." 62 The expeditionary method of deploying and fighting must be developed through innovative training exercises that stress unit leaders and soldiers. In the same manner, HS mission sets demand a certain agility. Our NG soldiers could be involved in multiple, near simultaneous, diverse mission sets and must be trained to jump from their federal war time mission to serving their neighbor, and back again.
MATERIEL
Ensuring that each NG Fires BDE is fielded with all of their authorized equipment (unlike today) with no substitutes must be the materiel management goal. 63 Total materiel readiness will involve significant equipment fielding and new equipment training as the Army transforms, and require significant coordination with and effort from state level logisticians and maintainers.
Extra training will likely be required by maintainers to care for new equipment. Keeping the NG Fires BDEs maintained and equipped to standard is a critical component of successfully supporting the modularity concept and meeting future deployability requirements.
Because the Fires BDE equipment has not been designed or fielded to specifically contribute to the HS mission, it is critical that the Fires BDE, in concert with the state interagency, review planned contingencies and determine the viability of the Fires BDE's equipment for potential HS missions. For example, the Army radio, constructed to operate securely in a tactical environment, may not interface with the radios currently in use within the interagency, requiring a pre-determined work around or alternate approach. The support arrangements that have been used within the states for many years to facilitate NG involvement in forest fires and other natural disasters will provide a solid foundation for such a review. This is not a Fires BDE unique issue and must be addressed in total by states and NGB as the HS mission matures.
PERSONNEL
The future of the Army is centered on its soldiers and our transformation efforts must include and ensure their success. The same soldiers who are performing so admirably now are the same soldiers that will lead us through the transformation process. As stated in the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, "Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly motivated … personnel, at all levels, is the essential prerequisite for achieving success." 64 It is critical that the Army continue to recruit, care for and retain the right soldiers to ensure success. Personnel issues within the HS arena dovetail into those discussed above. Whether a soldier is activated for service overseas or within the continental United States, he/she is still not at home or at work and the same support structures must be in place.
FACILITIES
The facility requirements for a Fires BDE will depend largely on the organic equipment of the new Fires BDE (e.g. wheeled or track). Facilities will be required to house and maintain the equipment and personnel assigned to the unit. Based on the uniqueness of this requirement, each Fires BDE should analyze their requirements against their assets and raise discrepancies to NGB through their chain of command. HS mission requirements have negligible effect on facility requirements.
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